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Sample 1

NATO, Kosovo, and the Use of Force: an Analytical Perspective

 

1. Introduction

 

More than a decade after the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the case remains one of the most disputed and discussed not only from the perspective of international law, but also in terms of policy implementation and conflict resolution. The 1999 Kosovo intervention, aiming to prevent the alleged atrocities, committed by the Milosevic government upon the Albanian community in the then Serbian province, is undoubtedly one of the most poignant passages in the contemporary political history of the Balkan peninsula, and one of the most alarming reminders for the unsettled legal nature of ‘the use of force’. The 1999 Kosovo intervention raises awareness about the enforcement mechanisms of international law, it asks questions about the legal personality of regional organizations, (as subjects of international law), but perhaps, most importantly, it questions the capability of international law and the international community to deal with regional ethnic conflicts.

The NATO intervention in 1999 therefore remains one of the most challenging, but yet illustrative cases of the doctrine of the use of force.1 This paper will tackle some of the legal aspects of the intervention and it will be structured as followed: the next section will clearly formulate the research question and the hypothesis/position of the author. It will be followed by a brief description on the origins of the conflict. The historical evolution and some of the key categories of the use of force will be mentioned, in order to provide theoretical background to help illustrate the arguments, embedded in the practical legal case. The paper will also include the legal basis of NATO, as well as the legal response of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Based on the legal basis of both sides, the paper will provide critical assessment of the situation through a close reading and discourse analysis of some key legal texts. The final section will briefly comment on the future of international law and its instruments for the prevention of violent conflicts.

 

2. Research question

 

This paper will explore the legal basis of the actions undertaken by NATO against FRY in 1999 and will answer the question whether these actions were legal. One cannot deny the complexity of the situation in Yugoslavia in 1999, but probably asked in this way, the research question renders the topic a sense of deceptive simplicity. Yet, the most straightforward and obvious questions are sometimes the most difficult to answer, and to find out whether NATO had a significant legal base to intervene in FRY in 1999 is a generic, but still an alarming and necessary inquiry.

This paper will hypothesize that the NATO bombings in Kosovo in 1999 were illegal and violated basic provisions of international law. The methodology, which will be deployed in the paper, is simple – it will rely upon a close reading of key legal texts such as the NATO Treaty, the UN Charter, as well as some UN Security Council Resolutions. NATO’s legal base will be refuted through a textual analysis of its main stipulations. Although this paper defends the position, that NATO’s intervention in FRY was illegal, it does not vindicate the atrocities and possible genocide committed against the Albanian community in Kosovo by Slobodan Milosevic and his government. It will only attempt to provide a legal assessment of the situation, and will not delve into its political aspects.

 

3. Origins of the conflict

 

Although the research question targets the legality of NATO’s actions in FRY, a short observation on the possible causes of ethnic strife between Albanians and Serbs is crucial for understanding the legal base of both NATO and FRY.

The researchers on Yugoslavia and the Balkans provide a myriad of possible explanations for the conflict in 1999, but this paper will mention only few of them.

Until February 2008, Kosovo was politically part of Serbia, despite the certain level of autonomy, which the province has always maintained. When Serbia gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in the beginning of the last century, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was established, and Kosovo, with 65 per cent of its population consisting of Albanians, who were Muslims, was included in what became known as the First Yugoslavia. Historians like Meier and Crampton describe a process of massive Serbianization of Kosovo.2 This process became known as the Colonization of Kosovo and included Serbian settlers moving to Kosovo. They were obtaining land from the Albanian population illegally, and some of the Albanians were forced to leave.3 In 1931 the population of Kosovo remained 63% Albanian 4, so it is clear that the colonization movement had failed except for a few isolated Albanian towns that became more Serbian.

These historical factors predisposed towards ethnic tensions, with the Albanians being in an inferior position compared to other ethnic communities in the region. In the early 20th century, the ethnic divisions between Muslim - populated Kosovo, which had the status of a province, and the domineering Serbian nation were already potent enough to create nationalistic sentiments on both sides, which soon transformed into policies and a form of ethnic co-habitation, which did not necessarily facilitate ethnic tolerance.

During Tito’s years the Kosovo Albanians received a fairly equal treatment, like the rest of the ethnic minorities which resided in the second Yugoslavia (1945 onwards). 5 This was Tito’s version of socialism, which was characterized by a certain level of autonomy of the different republics, and the minorities living in them. Although Tito and some of his closest people used bureaucratic mechanisms (such as the Constitution of 1974 and the Law of Associated Labour of 1976) 6 in order to void the ethnic differences between the communities, historic tensions could hardly be erased. They started to resurface after Tito’s death in 1980 and were exacerbated by certain political figures, gaining momentum at the time. One of them was Slobodan Milosevic. He and a certain group of political intellectuals took on an old and dusty idea of greater Serbia and the unification of all the Serbs in one great strong country (Serbian nationalism).7 Historically buried ideas such as Pan-Serbianism were revived and became part of the political discourse. Milosevic’s politics was exclusive and stigmatized the non-Serbian communities in Yugoslavia such as the Bosnian Muslims and the Kosovo Albanians.8 Milosevic revisited the Kosovo question and managed to create a vision of the Kosovo Albanians as threatening and secessionist. Only a couple of years later, the demise of Yugoslavia became the political catalyst, which paved the way for old cravings for independence and domination of some ethnic communities over others.

 

4. The Use of force - evolution and categories

The concept of the use of force has evolved through the years, to take on the features we recognize today in international law.

In the early days of international law, there was the doctrine of Just War, as proposed by Grotius and St. Augustine. Under this theory, war was illegal, unless undertaken for a just cause. 9

In the following decades, there was no legal objective to a state’s decision to go to war, and states could go to war for almost everything. The glorious stage of the evolution of the concept came in the 20th century, naturally after the destruction and chaos caused by the World Wars. The early 20th century saw the first attempts to outlaw war completely, first as proposed by the League of Nations and then by the Kellog-Briand pact in 1928. Although it was not binding in its propositions, the pact paved the way for the UN charter, which was signed in 1945. It was the first collective attempt of the international community to deem war illegal. The innovation and legal determination, which the Charter brought is very well illustrated by Article 2(4), which says “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. 10

There are several categories of the use of force: self-defence in response to or against the attack on the territory of a state; collective self-defence, which is lawful in the same cases as self-defence; invitation and civil wars (when a state requests the deployment of military forces); reprisals; protection of nationals at home and abroad; humanitarian intervention; self-determination and national liberation movements, and hot pursuit. 11 The category, which relates directly to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 is humanitarian intervention, and it will be addressed in the following sections.

 

5. NATO’s legal basis

 

In order to estimate the legality of NATO’s actions in FRY in 1999 we must have a clear perception of its legal basis to go to war and the exact order of the events, which preceded this decision.

A very clear account of the key events is provided by Shah (2001) and Youngs, Oaks and Bowers (1999).12 The conflict in Kosovo between the guerrilla forces of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and government forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) began in February 1998. To prevent further advance of the KLA, Belgrade launched a major counter-offensive, forcing back the guerillas.

On 23 March 1999, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana delegated responsibility to the Alliance's Supreme Commander, General Wesley Clark, to start air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The decision was a direct response of Belgrade's refusal to accept the peace accords, negotiated at Rambouillet in France. By that time, the international community was already perceiving the situation in Kosovo as a humanitarian disaster – a position, which gave NATO more than enough political, if not legal credibility to go to war with Yugoslavia.

The main argument for NATO’s intervention is that the conflict was a threat to the stability in the region. At the time NATO intervened, numbers were speaking for themselves – there were over 250 000 displaced people, thousands were homeless and the war had cost the lives of more than 2000 people. 13 This leads to the key point of NATO’s legal basis – humanitarian intervention. Some experts such as Portella (2000), Shreuer (1999) and Legault (2000) claim that this was the only tenable grounds for NATO’s actions in 1999. 14 NATO had the genuine desire to protect the Kosovo Albanians from the atrocities, committed by the Yugoslav army. Others even claimed that Yugoslavia committed genocide against the Kosovo Albanians – a position, which is still legally challenging, despite the ferocity of the conflict and the heavy human toll. 15

The next part of NATO’s legal basis comes from Article 4 of the NATO Treaty. It is considered crucial for understanding the reasons behind the attacks. Article 4 says “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened”. It is now clear that Article 4 was one the legal tenets in NATO’s legal basis.16

In short, the military alliance intervened in accordance to the doctrine of collective security, because the member-states were concerned for the peace in the region. Many proponents of the neo-liberal theory of International Relations would be satisfied with NATO’s collective response and its willingness to act as a unitary actor in regional affairs, but this theoretical breakthrough does not justify basic provisions in international law and leaves the role of regional organizations as peace-makers unexplained. A critical analysis of NATO’s legal base will be provided after the position of FRY is discussed in the next section.

 

6. Yugoslavia’s position

Yugoslavia’s main argument in its defense was the violation of its national sovereignty by the NATO intervention. The conflict in Kosovo was labeled by the Milosevic government as an internal affair, which needs to be dealt by internally, without foreign intervention. Eventually, Yugoslavia filed a case against NATO in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, the ICJ declined jurisdiction over Serbia’s complaint, because at that time Yugoslavia was not a member of the UN. 17

Whether the position of the Yugoslav government is legally credible is a topic of another discussion, but it definitely reveals an underlying controversy between concepts such as state sovereignty, human rights, and foreign intervention.

 

7. A critical assessment: was it legal?

 

The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention

This section will provide a systematic analysis of the legal basis of NATO, and will attempt to highlight the main points of contention, as well as some legal controversies. NATO’s leading tenet was that the intervention is humanitarian. The atrocities, committed by FRY against the Albanians in Kosovo are undoubtedly a human rights violation, but does this give any legitimacy for a regional alliance to use force in this situation? Experts in the field are unanimous, that NATO was most probably lead by the genuine desire to protect the Kosovo Albanians. 18 Still, does this mean that we are talking about humanitarian intervention? Even from a purely theoretical perspective, humanitarian intervention is highly debatable. According to some, it even runs against article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.19 One definition of humanitarian intervention reads:

 

[…]under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, it is alleged that one state (State A) may use force in the territory of another state (State B) in order to protect the human rights of individuals in State B, usually being nationals of State B[…] is an alleged genera right to intervene with force for humanitarian purposes without the consent of the territorial sovereign, as where government is systematically murdering whole sections of its own population” (Dixon 2007, p. 323-324).20

 

Although some compliance of NATO’s actions with the second part of the definition can be found, the inconsistency with the first part of the definition is more than palpable. The first part of the definition conceptualizes humanitarian intervention as a state-to-state action (State A and State B), and it does not give credence to organizations or any other alliances. This is the major weakness in the first point of NATO’s legal basis.

 

Article 4 of the NATO Treaty revisited

To understand why NATO’s actions were illegal, we need to revisit article 4 of the NATO Treaty. It says that “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened”. 21 NATO’s defenders said that the alliance has acted under article 4, after a consultation between the parties and the unanimous decision to attack Yugoslavia. Still, there is an obvious violation of the second part of the article, which says “the security of any of the Parties is threatened”. 22 The humanitarian action argument holds that NATO claims intervened to protect the Kosovo Albanians (as an ethnic group). An ethnic group could not be considered a member of NATO, even if one generously stretches the definition of “Party” to non-state actors. In other words, NATO’s application of article 4 to justify its actions is inconsistent with the parameters of the actual intervention, which attempted to protect a minority, mistreated by a home government.

 

The UN Charter: Limited exceptions of article 2(4) - articles 51 and 42

A close reading of the UN Charter reveals that NATO’s actions turn out to be inconsistent with some of its provisions. Schreuer highlights two major exceptions to article 2 (4) of the UN Charter and they will be discussed next.23

The prohibition of the use of force, as embodied in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, is one of the cornerstones of contemporary international law. One of its limited exceptions is the right to self-defence provided for in Article 51 of the Charter. Article 51 requires an "armed attack [. . .] against a Member of the United Nations" in order to be applied.24 Again, like in the above analysis with the NATO Treaty, we can apply the same argument, that the Albanians in Kosovo are an ethnic group or even ethnic nation, not a political entity, let alone a member of the UN. Even if one wants to theorize about the status of the Kosovo province after February 2008, when Kosovo proclaimed its independence from Serbia, the argument still does not hold water, because Kosovo is not a nation-state and 10 per cent of its population is Serbian. To claim that the Kosovo Albanians form a nation in the political sense of the word means to exclude the Serbs residing on the territory of Kosovo from the picture, which is impossible. This is a demographic peculiarity, which eliminates the statehood argument in the case of the Kosovo Albanians whatsoever.

Another exception to Article 2(4) of the Charter is Article 42. Before taking enforcement action, the Security Council has to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or a breach to the peace under article 39. 25 Threat to the peace and breach to the peace are very difficult to define and leave a lot of space for interpretation. Still, the Security Council has repeatedly characterized massive human rights violations or grave humanitarian situations as threats to the peace. That is why the Security Council imposed embargo and affirmed that the situation in Kosovo was a threat to the peace with Resolutions 1160 and 1199.26 Although it issued the resolutions, it never took or authorized military action. In other words, although under article 39 of the Charter the UN identified a breach to the peace, this did not automatically authorize member states to use force to implement any of the Council’s decisions. As Schreuer clarifies, the Council must take a separate decision under article 42. 27

 

The legal personality of NATO

To understand better the inconsistency of NATO’s actions in Yugoslavia with the main provisions of the use of force, we have to discuss the legal personality of NATO under international law. Under Article 52 of the UN Charter, NATO is a regional arrangement.28 As such, it can deal with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. However, these actions must be consistent with the Principles of the UN. The UN policy on military intervention by regional arrangements in UN Article 53 states the Security Council can, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. 29 However, no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements without the authorization of the Security Council. In other words, although the UN Security Council acknowledged the severity of the situation in Kosovo and imposed sanctions on the Yugoslav government, it did not authorize NATO to military intervene in the region.

 

8. Conclusion and the future of international law

Milosevic’s atrocities against the Kosovo Albanians were clearly a violation of the international human rights standards, but they did justify the military intervention undertaken by NATO in 1999 on behalf of the Albanian community. Although the alliance had the clear motivation to protect the ones displaced and exterminated by the Milosevic government, it did not act according to the provisions of the use of force.

The NATO intervention raises some doubts about the relation between major concepts of international law such as state sovereignty, humanitarian intervention and the role of regional organizations in peace making. In addition, it raises a more general question about the preventive instruments of international law for regional, intra-state conflicts. Despite the amount of legislation, which has been produced in the last several decades, international law does not have much to say about the prevention of ethnic conflict. Although a lot has been done in terms of enforcement, the Kosovo cases, and other, ‘unprevented’ tragedies, such as the Srebrenica genocide in 1995, are a reminder, that the international community may not lack the will, but it definitely lacks the legal mechanisms to act before, not after a catastrophe has occurred.

 

Bibliography:

 

Aust, A. (2005) Handbook of International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 52-116

 

Cassese, A. (2005) International Law, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 317-529

 

Charter of the United Nations (1945), San Francisco, 26 June

Available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml

Accessed [18.09.10]

 

Cigar, N. (1994) Genocide in Bosnia. The Politics of ‘Ethnic Cleansing’. Texas A and M University Press.

 

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), 9 December

Available at: http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html

Accessed [13.09.10]

 

Crampton, R. J. (2002) The Balkans Since the Second World War, Pearson Education Limited, England

 

Dixon, M. (2007) Textbook on International Law, 6th Edition. Oxford University Press, UK, pp. 310-340

 

International Court of Justice (1999) “Decisions on Yugoslavia vs the NATO states” June 2, 1999

Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?p1=6&p2=1&p3=-1&pt=1&y=1999

Accessed [ 17.09.10]

 

Klabbers, J. (2002), An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

 

Legault, A. (2000) “NATO Intervention in Kosovo: the Legal Context”, Canadian Military Journal

Available at: http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo1/no1/doc/63-66-eng.pdf

Accessed [12.09.10]

 

Meier, V. (1999) Yugoslavia. A History of Its Demise., transl. by Sabrina Ramet, Routledge, London

 

Miller, N. (2004) “Postwar Serbian Nationalism and the Limits of Intervention”, in Contemporary European History, 13, 2. pp. 151-169, Cambridge University Press, UK

 

Milosevic, S. (1989) “St. Vitius Day Speech”, Gazimestan , June 28

Available at: http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/spch-kosovo1989.htm

Viewed [20.09.10]

 

Newman, B. (1957) Tito’s Yugoslavia. Robert Hale Ltd, London, UK.

Pease, K.S. (1999) International Organizations: Perspectives on Governance in the 21st century, Pearson Education, London, UK.

 

Portella, C. (2000) “Humanitarian Intervention, NATO, and International Law”, Berlin Information Centre For Trans-Atlantic Security (BITS), Research Report 00.4, December

Available at: http://www.bits.de/public/pdf/rr00-4.pdf

Accessed [ 14.09.10]

 

Shah, A. (2001) “The Kosovo Crisis”, Global Issues, 21 January

Available at: http://www.globalissues.org/article/126/the-kosovo-crisis

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Shaw, M. (2005) International Law, 5th Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK

 

Shreurer, C. ( 1999) “Is there a Legal Basis for the NATO Intervention in Kosovo?” International Law FORUM du droit international l: 151-134, Kluwer Law International. The Netherlands.

Available at: http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/kosovo.pdf

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Silber, L. and Little, A (1996)The Death of Yugoslavia, 2nd edition, Penguin Books, BBC Books

 

Thomas, G. (1999) “NATO and International Law”, Online Opinion, 15 May

Available at: http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=1647&page=0

Accessed [14.09.10]

 

The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), Washington D.C., 4 April

Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

Accessed [ 14.09.10]

 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998), 31 March

Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980331.SC6496.html

Accessed [ 13.09.10]

 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998), 23 September

Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980923.sc6577.html

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United Nations Security Council Resolution 819 (1993), 16 April

Available at : http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930416a.htm

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United Nations Security Council Resolution 836 (1993), 4 June

Available at: http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930604a.htm

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Youngs, T., Oaks, M., Bowers, P. (1999), “Kosovo: NATO and Military Action”, International Affairs and Defence, House of Commons Library, Research Paper 99/34

Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-034.pdf

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Zajmi, F. (2000) “Re-Fighting Kosova. A Kosovar’s Perspective”, Central Europe Review Vol 2, No 26, 3 July

Available at : http://www.ce-review.org/00/26/zajmi26.html

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1 See Dixon, M. Textbook on International Law, 6th Edition. Oxford University Press, UK, pp. 310-340, 2007 and Klabbers, J. An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. , 2002

 

2 See Meier, V. Yugoslavia. A History of Its Demise., transl. by Sabrina Ramet, Routledge, London, 1999

 

3 See Cigar, N. Genocide in Bosnia. The Politics of ‘Ethnic Cleansing’. Texas A and M University Press, 1994 and Newman, B. Tito’s Yugoslavia. Robert Hale Ltd, London, UK, 1957.

 

 

4 See Meier, 1999 and Crampton, R. J. The Balkans Since the Second World War, Pearson Education Limited, England, p. 245-266, 2002

5 Ibid

6 See Crampton, 2002

7 See Miller, N. “Postwar Serbian Nationalism and the Limits of Intervention”, in Contemporary European History, 13, 2. pp. 151-169, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2004; Silber, L. and Little, A. The Death of Yugoslavia, 2nd edition, Penguin Books, BBC Books, 1996

 

 

8See Milosevic, S. “St. Vitius Day Speech”, Gazimestan , June 28, 1989

Available at: http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/spch-kosovo1989.htm

Viewed [20.09.10]

 

 

9 See Dixon, 2007; Aust, A. Handbook of International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 52-116, 2005; Cassese, A. International Law, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 317-529, 2005

 

 

10 See Charter of the United Nations, Ar. 2 (4), San Francisco, 26 June, 1945, Available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml

Accessed [18.09.10]

 

11 See Dixon, 2007, pp. 315-328

12 See Youngs, T., Oaks, M., Bowers, P. , “Kosovo: NATO and Military Action”, International Affairs and Defence, House of Commons Library, Research Paper 99/34, 1999

Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-034.pdf

Accessed [20.09.10] and Shah, A. “The Kosovo Crisis”, Global Issues, 21 January, 2001

Available at: http://www.globalissues.org/article/126/the-kosovo-crisis

 

 

 

13 Ibid

14 See Shreurer, C. “Is there a Legal Basis for the NATO Intervention in Kosovo?” International Law FORUM du droit international l: 151-134, Kluwer Law International. The Netherlands, 1999.

Available at: http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/kosovo.pdf, Accessed [20.09.10]; Portella, C. “Humanitarian Intervention, NATO, and International Law”, Berlin Information Centre For Trans-Atlantic Security (BITS), Research Report 00.4, December, 2000

Available at: http://www.bits.de/public/pdf/rr00-4.pdf

Accessed [ 14.09.10], Legault, A. “NATO Intervention in Kosovo: the Legal Context”, Canadian Military Journal, 2000, Available at: http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo1/no1/doc/63-66-eng.pdf

Accessed [12.09.10]

 

 

 

15 See Thomas, G. “NATO and International Law”, Online Opinion, 15 May, 1999

Available at: http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=1647&page=0

 

16 See The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 4, Washington D.C., 4 April, 1949

Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

 

17 See International Court of Justice, “Decisions on Yugoslavia vs the NATO states” June 2, 1999

Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?p1=6&p2=1&p3=-1&pt=1&y=1999

Accessed [ 17.09.10]

 

18 See Shreurer, 1999

19 Ibid and Dixon, 2007

20 See Dixon, 2007

21 See NATO Treaty, Article 4, 1949

22 Ibid, 1949

23 See Schreuer, 1999

24 See Charter of the UN, Article 51, 1945

25 Ibid, Articles 39 and 42, 1945

26 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160, 31 March, 1998

Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980331.SC6496.html

Accessed [ 13.09.10] and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199, 23 September, 1998

Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980923.sc6577.html

Accessed [13.09.10]

 

 

27 See Schreuer, 1999

28 See Charter of the UN, Article 52, 1945

29 Ibid, Article 53, 1945

 

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